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ABSTRACT
The enormous popularity of Online Social Networks (OSNs)
dramatically changed the way people communicate and in-
teract with each other. Unfortunately, the centralized con-
trol employed by OSN providers, such as Facebook, have
negative impacts as it leads to privacy concerns. In fact,
OSN providers can directly access a big amount of informa-
tion about users and infer further information when using
data mining techniques (e.g., about the on line interactions
among two users).
In this paper we propose VirtualFriendship, i.e., a collab-
orative solution that allows OSN users to browse each oth-
ers’ “profile” and to exchange messages in the OSN, while
the end-peers of the interactions remain anonymous with
respect to the OSN provider. We demonstrate by a proof of
knowledge implementation (VF-App) the feasibility of our
solution. Furthermore, our analysis and thorough set of ex-
periments also show that the overhead introduced by our
solution is very limited, and we believe negligible from a
user perspective.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communications Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and So-
ciety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Online Social Networks, privacy, anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs), like Facebook, Google+,
and LinkedIn, have conquered current society and become
an important communication channel for million users. In
fact, OSNs offer an easy way to share information and keep
updated with friends’ activities. Naturally, OSNs implicitly
became the depository of large quantities of users shared in-
formation. They are provided with the means to extract and
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access huge amounts of sensitive information, either directly
or through data mining techniques. In this way, OSNs can
easily infer user’s closest friends (e.g., by mining the num-
ber and type of interactions among them), interests, polit-
ical and social orientation. A recent example of possible
collection and mining over users data is the NSA PRISM
project [35], apparently authorized from US federal judges
overseeing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
In addition, providers may grant advertisement companies
access without the user’s consent for economical reasons [36].
Inherently, all these worrisome issues lead to the increase of
privacy and security concerns among users [22].
Currently, most OSN providers make some customizable
“privacy settings” to its users, so that each user can em-
ploy some levels of access control on his published content.
Whilst such mechanism provides users with a certain level
of control, it also relies on the trustworthiness of the OSN
providers in managing their content and enforcing access
control rules. Hence, the most effective solution for privacy
enforcement in OSNs is to give full control to the users or
to build new OSN systems more effective in protecting users
privacy. Towards this goal, several solutions have been pro-
posed: some rely on cryptographic techniques [2, 5, 7, 25,
31]; and some on new proposed systems mostly peer-to-peer
based [15, 21]. However, even if content is kept confidential
from the prying eyes of unwanted viewers, the interactions
between users may disclose sensitive information [8, 28, 41].
Also, for peer-to-peer based solutions [15, 21], the availabil-
ity of information represents an concerns. Furthermore, the
tradeoff of moving to a new OSN provider and lose the inter-
action with potentially less privacy-concern friends is high.
Most solutions, however, tackle the problem of privacy
as confidentiality of the content. In fact, they aim to hide
the content from un authorized viewers, with main focus on
the OSN provider. Nonetheless, as observed in [3] the OSN
provider is still able to learns and to extract extra sensitive
information based on users behavior, such as the strength of
relationships, by employing data mining techniques. Hence,
in this paper, we address a specific class of privacy con-
cerns, i.e., where sensitive information can be inferred from
the behavior and connections of users. For example, if Alice
accesses Bob’s profile very often, just because Bob shares
information in line with Alice’s interests. Then, the OSN
could classify Bob as Alice close friend. In order to avoid
such leakage, Alice needs to access Bob’s information in such
a way that the OSN is kept oblivious. Usually, anonymous
networks, such as Tor [19], are used as the solution to hide
identity of the communication and achieve anonymity. How-
ever, users in OSNs are required to be log in, and thus, such
solutions would not work.
In this paper we propose, to the best of our knowledge,
the first hybrid system approach, named VirtualFriendship
(or VF for short). In this way, there is no need to re-design
current OSNs nor advocate the move to new freshly privacy-
friendly OSNs. Our solution, allows users to keep the infor-
mation stored in any centralized OSN, while communicat-
ing anonymously. To do so, VirtualFriendship performs all
private communications using a decentralized peer-to-peer
system, where each peer is represented by a user in the sys-
tem. To achieve anonymity and unobservability, we present
the novel concept of routing friends, where users abuse the
social trust, as defined in [17], of their OSN connections to
route and process requests. Also, the routing friends channel
the communication through an anonymous network, such as
Tor, to conserve the requester identity. In this way, users
communicate privately towards a decentralized channel by
keep all the benefits of storage of centralized OSNs.
To demonstrate the feasibility of VirtualFriendship, we
implemented it as a proof-of-concept (VF-App) in the form
of a Firefox extension. Further, we have analyzed the VF-
app performance and practicality when using Facebook.
Contributions: This paper makes several contributions.
First, it presents a hybrid solution to protect OSN user’s
anonymity with respect to the OSN provider. In particu-
lar we anonymize user when accessing information of other
users, keeping at the same time also the real friendship
weight oblivious. Second, our solution also allows two OSN
users to communicate in a privacy friendly way. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first solution that achieves these
goals while preserving current OSN functionalities (e.g., in
our particular implementation for Facebook). In the pro-
cess, we identify several open issues and future research di-
rections. Finally, we build and evaluate an open-source pro-
totype.
Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 surveys the related work. Section 3 describes our
system, adversarial models and sketches the privacy goals.
Section 4 formalizes the architecture and operations of our
system, while Section 5 analyses the security. We describe
our prototype implementation in Section 6. Later, Section 7
presents a short discussion on possible extensions. Finally,
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section we review some related work that addresses
different privacy issues in OSNs. With the increase popu-
larity of OSNs several privacy concerns start to arise which
have prompted a large interest within the research commu-
nity. A number of studies [9, 20, 23, 27] enumerate privacy
issues and challenges in OSNs. Recently, [1] reviewed the
state of the art in privacy OSN and defined several open
questions.
Most proposed solutions focus on protecting user’s pub-
lished content information which is directly available to OSN
providers, such as profile information, status updates, com-
ments, and images. For instance, solutions like FaceVPSN [14]
and NOYB [25] protect Facebook users profile information
by using fake information. While systems such as [2, 5, 7,
31] make use of cryptographic mechanisms to enforce confi-
dentiality and access control to the published content shared
by the users. However, even if the content is protected using
such solutions, such solutions do not consider the anonymity
issue, i.e., an adversary can still infer sensitive information
from the interactions. For example, Facebook, already uses
such information to display the top friends of each user on
the right hand side of the main page, and also on the chat
and content likes order.
In [3] the authors address a different, yet equally impor-
tant, class of privacy issues in OSNs: the fact that sensi-
tive information can be inferred by user behavior. They
study and analyze the privacy guarantees with respect to
user anonymity, considering users introducing dummy traffic
in OSNs. The issue of this solution is the extended storage
overhead with amount of information that each user needs
to generate and dump into the OSN.
Other solutions take a more drastic approach proposing
new systems to replace existing OSNs: examples of such
solutions are Diaspora [21] and Safebook [16], mainly based
on decentralized architecture. Unfortunately, these solutions
rely not only on the availability of peers but also on the
assumption that a large mass of users move to a new system,
in detriment to existing ones where all their friends are.
In contrast to previous solutions, the proposals in [17, 32]
use OSN graph as mixers to provide anonymity. Drac [17]
proposes an architecture to provide anonymity and unob-
servability for low-volume communications, such as chat mes-
saging. Pisces [32], on the other hand, proposes a decen-
tralized anonymous communication protocol as an alterna-
tive to Tor [19]. Both make use of the social trust of OSN
friendships to initiate the circuit to relay anonymous traffic.
As result, Dynamix [33] analyses how anonymity is affected
when the social graph is dynamic. However, such solutions
present a different threat model and do not aim to address
OSN concerns. Furthermore, due to the fact that users re-
quire to be registered and logged in when using OSNs, the
direct use of such system does not really help to protect
users anonymity towards the OSN provider.
3. MODEL
In this section, we explain our system model and assump-
tions (Section 3.1), as well as the adversarial model we con-
sider in this paper (Section 3.2). We conclude by sketching
the main privacy goals this work aims to solve (Section 3.3).
In Table 1, we summarize the notations used throughout the
paper.
3.1 System Model
We consider a system where the OSN is centralized (e.g.,
Facebook) and follows the OSN definition from [9], such
that: users create profiles P, have a list of friends R with
whom have relationships, share interests and a messages m.
Without loss of generality, throughout the rest of the paper,
we consider two users of an untrusted OSN: Alice and Bob,
such that, PAlice represents Alice’s profile andRAlice her list
of friendship relationships in the OSN. We stress that PAlice
information is private and only accessible by her friends in
RAlice, and by the OSN provider.
Besides all the traffic that Alice can perform when using a
OSN, we generalize and assume that Alice performs mainly
the following three actions: (1) accesses Bob’s private in-
formation PBob; (2) exchanges messages m with Bob; and
(3) post comments. We assume that all exchanged messages
are encrypted and hidden from the OSN provider or other
prying eyes. In addition, we note that on our system, Alice
is not required to be a registered member of the OSN to
retrieve Bob’s information.
Table 1: Notation
Symbol Meaning
u Identity of the users (e.g., Alice and Bob)
m content exchanged among users (e.g., com-
ment, post)
Pu Profile of the user u
Ru Relationships of the user u
τu Authorization token for Pu
Llu List or group of users, with label l, defined
by u
Λu User u local server
Fu Routing Friend of u, used as connecting
point to u’s information (e.g., Pu or m)
Γn(u,u′) List of size n containing the tuples (Fui ,Λi)
that u can use to access content from u′
(pku,sku),κ Asymmetric key pair (public and private
keys), and symmetric key from user u
3.2 Adversarial Model
Throughout the rest of the paper we will consider a pas-
sive adversary that monitors the user traffic in the OSN (e.g.,
OSN provider), and is able to access users’ content, the list
of friends of every single user in the OSN and the interac-
tions between them. We infer that such adversary adheres
to the honest-but-curious model by following with the proto-
col specification and not tampering with content. However,
such adversary aims to eavesdrop, track and recover infor-
mation of the communication, in such a way that he can
compute (for example, by using probabilistic methods) the
weight matching the importance of friendship connections
and retrieve main interests. For instance, a naive approach
on computing the friendship strength between two users is to
consider that each interaction is of power one and the final
strength is the sum of all interactions. Also, the adversary
should be kept oblivious of the real shared content.
We assume that direct social relationships R are trusted,
i.e., that a single user trust his friends as the entry and
exit points of the relay circuit. However, we consider that
the exit points of the relay system do not deviate from
the protocol specification, modeled as honest but curious.
Furthermore, we assume that all communications are en-
crypted, and that the profile information can be concealed
using methods like FaceVPSN [14] or NOYB [25]. Although,
it is assume that OSNs do not allow publish of encrypted
content, we argue that this ca be bypassed as in [5, 31]. Fi-
nally, we stress the fact that side channels attacks, such as
timing and correlation attacks, are beyond the scope of this
paper.
3.3 Privacy Definitions and Goals
Privacy in OSNs have lead to discussion and interests by
the research community and the media. Yet, the difficulty
of the problem is far from solved. In fact, providing a def-
inition on privacy in a OSN system is a challenging task
that we do not aim to solve within this paper. As defined
in [26], privacy can be defined as different paradigms. We
mainly focus on privacy as confidentiality and the right to
hide sensitive information. However, such paradigm can also
be divided into different categories, due to the complexity
of information shared in OSNs. Therefore, in this paper we
consider such categories as our privacy goals and we divide
them as follows:
User Anonymity: we aim that Alice is not identifiable
towards other entities (i.e., OSN provider and other users,
inclusive Bob), when accessing Bob’s profile or other con-
tent in the OSN. In this way, the real friendship weight as
defined in [3] is not given to an adversary. In addition, Al-
ice’s interests are also kept oblivious to the adversary as its
traffic is routed.
Communication Anonymity: we target that the commu-
nication among two users is unobservable. In other words,
that it is hard to detect that Alice and Bob are exchanging
messages.
Content Privacy: to guarantee that the content exchanged
or published is kept confidential. The content can be en-
trusted with a limited of recipients by creating access lists.
Also, the system should guarantee the integrity of publishing
content to avoid impersonation attacks.
In addition, the system should be deployable and the de-
sign of the system should be an hybrid design, i.e., it should
keep the central structure and general functionality of the
OSN, providing availability of data. While the private com-
munication should be done using a decentralized peer-to-
peer system, where each peer is represented by a user in the
system.
4. VIRTUALFRIENDSHIP SYSTEM
In this section we start by sketching an overview of the
architecture, followed by a full detailed description of the
proposed solution that this work addresses.
4.1 Architecture
Our system is a hybrid system; each user u in the system
besides of being represented in the OSN with Pu it also
runs a local server Λu that allows to relay the traffic outside
the centralized control of the OSN. The collection of the
local servers Λu can be seen as an additional independent
decentralized network. The local servers Λu are used to
route users’ traffic, such as, establish connections, extract
profiles and make comments. Along with an anonymous
network (AN), such as Tor, users can perform the actions
aforementioned in an anonymous way. In addition, they
also verify if the user requesting the information is allowed
to access it. For instance, if Alice when requesting PBob
contains the authorization token τBob.
The architecture of our system involves three entities:
Users, the OSN and an Anonymous Network (AN).
Users: In the system we consider two types of users: (1) the
communication users, that are the users exchanging
information, e.g., Alice and Bob, where Alice requests
Bob’s profile; (2) the routing users/friends F , are reg-
ular users that act as the entry and exit points to the
requested information on the OSN (e.g., PBob). More
formally, exit points operate the request from the di-
rect connection (e.g., Alice) to another routing friend
from the destination (e.g., Bob) throughout an anony-
mous network (e.g., Tor). Whereas the entry points
authenticate and retrieve the requested content (e.g.,
PBob). In fact, each user in the system runs a local
server Λ that is distinguished by a unique identifier
(e.g., Facebook username), and holds an asymmetric
key pair (pk, sk). The key pair is generated when the
system is deployed and could be made available on
users profiles, for example, using a QR code image.
OSN: We assume the OSN to be any centralized OSN, such
as Facebook or Google+, and to be the base commu-
nication channel. Also, provide the availability of the
information.
Anonymous Network (AN): Tunneling through an AN pro-
vides attractive security and privacy features. While
the most marked is enhanced anonymity, it also offers
encryption. For our system, the anonymous network
is used to provide anonymity to the content requester
(e.g., Alice when requesting PBob). This can be any
centralized or decentralized AN, for instance, Tor [19]
or Tarzan [24] respectively. Although we assume the
use of Tor throughout the paper, the definition of a
AN goes beyond this research paper.
4.2 System Overview
We propose a hybrid architecture that allows users to com-
municate through any centralized OSN in an privacy friendly
way. With such solution there is no need to re-design cur-
rent OSNs nor advocate the switch to a new freshly designed
OSN. In contrast, users use an extra entities that allows
them to route traffic through a AN. This is done in a simi-
lar fashion as [17, 19, 32]. In this way, users keep the main
information stored in the OSN, which should be in encrypted
format [2, 5, 7, 31] or other fake information such as in [14,
25]. For instance, the case where Alice is a user of a OSN
that wants to perform a OSN action such as retrieving the
profile information from another OSN user Bob, in such a
way that the OSN is kept oblivious on the fact that Alice
accessed it. Note that Alice may be an independent outside
friend of Bob, i.e., as she is not required to be registered to
the OSN.
Usually, since Alice needs to be signed in to the OSN to
use it, there will be no point to route the traffic from in-
side the network. Thus, using an anonymous network (AN),
such as Tor, to browse the OSN would not be a valid op-
tion. Due to this Alice’s communications are required to be
routed outside the OSN. To do so, we introduce the con-
cept of routing friends F . Such friends act as intermediaries
for Alice – Bob communication. They receive requests and
redirect them using a AN to other routing friends.
In order to create an anonymous channel of communica-
tion Alice abuses the routing friends along with an AN. To
do so, we use Tor to create a tunnel between Alice - Bob us-
ing routing friends FAlicei and FBobj . The usage of FAlicei is
to protect Alice’s identity (e.g., Facebook ID or IP address)
when accessing the AN, which replaces Alice’s identity by
its own on the request. This occurs because in Tor users
need to place trust on the entry point, thus, we follow the
definition of social trust from [17]. As prior defined in our
model, we motivate the use of an AN on the fact that Alice
does not necessary trust the FBobj from the set Γn(Bob,Alice)
revealing his identity to the OSN provider or any other third
party.
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Figure 1: System Overview
To summarize, our system key design elements are as fol-
lows:
• Users perform content requests, exchange encrypted
messages, and publish information.
• Routing friends operate, re-direct requests and check
authorization tokens.
• Only authorized users can access and decrypt requested
content.
Figure 1 illustrates an overview of our system, where Alice
accesses Bob’s profile PBob using FBob2 , such that, FBob2 ∈
RBob. The connection between Alice and FBob2 is performed
using ΛAlice and ΛFBob2 that are connected through a AN.
Note that, FBob2 is a routing friend and is required to be
online to deal with Alice’s request. Also, Alice’s request can
also be performed directly to Bob. For users that only trust
their direct connection, and as in systems like Tor the first
entry point is required to be trusted, Alice can make her
request through her routing friend FAlice1 .
4.3 System Operations
In this section, we overview our system by describing the
operations users are able to perform. We highlight the fact
that we wish to provide the same main functionalities as
the OSN. However, in this work we does not address voting
actions, such as “like” in Facebook. We start by explaining
the initialization of the system, followed by the profile ex-
traction, and concluding with the handling of comments and
posts. We consider that both Alice and Bob are registered
and represented in the OSN by PAlice and PBob, respec-
tively. However, the process does not change if Alice is an
independent user not registered to the OSN.
Initialization
To bootstrap the system, Alice and Bob need to become con-
nected, in such a way that, Bob ∈ RAlice and Alice ∈ RBob.
When Alice and Bob establish a connection, they exchange
an initial set of values (Iu): composed by a list of routing
friends along with their Λ information and an authorization
token τ. Whereas, the τ is a random value used for user au-
thentication, the L represents the access groups pre-defined
by the user. Note that, Γ(,) is a sub set of L as not all
users in L act as a routing friend. Currently, the token τ
is a long lived token, however, it can become short lived
when associated with a timestamp. This option, however,
increases the communication overhead. Actually, Alice and
Bob can specify a τ per group L, assuming the anonymity
set is large enough (i.e., the amount of users in the group is
such that is hard to identify which one is accessing the con-
tent). Let Encpk(·) and Signsk(·) represent an asymmetric
encryption and a digital signature algorithms, respectively,
and {·}κ a symmetric authenticated encryption (e.g., AES
in CCM mode [40], or a dedicated scheme [42]), and H(·)
a collision resistant hash function. The initialization proto-
col, reported in Figure 2, is a two-step protocol initiated by
Alice. First, Alice encrypts (using pkBob) IAlice along with
a random nonce N , and add a signature for IAlice. Bob, on
the other hand, decrypts and verifies the authenticity of the
content. Then, Bob replies with the encryption (symmetric,
for efficiency reasons) of IBob. Note that, if Bob specifies
groups, such that, for example, Alice ∈ LWorkBob , then all
members in Γn(Alice,Bob) are also in LWorkBob . Subsequently,
the overhead storage of τ from each connection (e.g., Alice
storage of τBob) is linear with the number of connections,
whereas, the own τ (e.g., Alice manage τAlice) overhead is
either linear with the number of groups. For revocation,
Alice re-generates a new τ and shares with the connections
with the affected connections, either all or from a specific
group. This, however, creates a linear communication over-
head.
Currently, this process is operated between ΛAlice and
ΛBob, using the unique identifiers as the local server ad-
dresses. However, as it is performed in encrypted format,
this process can be executed using either an out-of-band
communication channel (e.g., email) or directly in-band (e.g.,
inside the OSN).
Let Iu ← {pku, τu,Γn(u,u′) ← [(Fuxi ,Λxi), ..., (Fuxn ,Λxn)]}
for u = {Alice,Bob}
Alice → Bob: EncpkBob(IAlice||N), SignskAlice(IAlice)
Alice ← Bob: {IBob}κ , s.t. κ = H(τAlice||N)
Figure 2: Initialization protocol between two users
– Alice and Bob.
A different approach, yet less efficient but forward se-
cure, is to use anonymous credentials [10, 12], where the
τ represents the proof of knowledge of a credential issued by
Bob. For instance, Bob issues a credential Alice for accessing
PBob, such that, when Alice requests PBob, she computes τ
as the proof of knowledge of the credential.
Accessing Content
In order to access Bob’s Profile (PB), Alice needs to be
previously authorized by Bob. Thus, Alice follows a three-
step protocol to access Bob’s content information. For easy
of the exposition, we now consider that Alice requests PBob.
However, this is easily extended to a generic content message
m. The three-step protocol is illustrated in Figure 3, and
described as follows.
1. Produce Request: Alice can issue a request in two ways.
She either: (i) contacts directly a routing friend of Bob
FBobj from Γn(Bob,Alice) (or directly Bob, if he is on-
line); (ii) use a friend FAlicei as a trusted entry point
of the AN (e.g., Tor). Thus, Alice uses his ΛAlice com-
ponent to send a request of the form (PBob, r, ψBob),
where r is a random value generated for the session,
and ψBob is a MAC of r using the τBob. We observe
that this protocol could be extended to use credentials:
where Alice request needs to prove she owns some cre-
dential issued by Bob.
2. Authenticate Request: To access the content, Alice
needs to provide a proof that she has τBob. Figure 3
sketches a simple method of authentication. FBobj
also knows τBob and, thus, is able to produce the same
MAC output as the one sent by Alice. If the authen-
tication fails, ΛFBobj replies ⊥ to Alice indicating a
reject on accessing the content. Otherwise, ΛFBobj re-
trieves and encrypts PBob using a hash of the token as
the key.
3. Process Request: The request is processed by Alice
upon received. Note that this step only occurs if the
authentication step is valid. If so, ΛAlice decrypts and
verifies µBob using the hash of τBob with r as the key.
In this way, Alice retrieves PBob in a way that the OSN
provider is kept oblivious. Actually, in the prying eyes
of the provider FBobj accessed PBob. Also Bob, as in
the normal functionality of the OSN (e.g., Facebook)
does not learn who accesses his profile.
Exchanging Messages
We now discuss how to privately send/read a message using
our system. For now, we assume that there is only two par-
ticipants, Alice and Bob, and later we discuss the scenario
of multiple recipients. In contrast to the protocol from, this
protocol does not make use explicitly of FBobj , and connects
directly to ΛBob. Note that for now we assume that both
users are online when they exchange a message (in practice,
ΛAlice would perform an initial check about peers being on-
line before engaging in a chat). As the goal is to avoid the
communication to be observable by the OSN prying eyes,
Alice and Bob establish a direct point to point secure chan-
nel, such as TLS [18], for the communication. To avoid the
fact that NSA is able to decrypt TLS packets as they have
access to some end points private keys [34, 35], we encrypt
the messages. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 4, for
the case where Alice initiates the exchange. Since the cryp-
tographic operations are handled by the components ΛAlice
and ΛBob, this authorization access procedure does not af-
fect the browser.
Let us now address the scenario of multiple recipients, let’s
say when Alice exchanges messages with Bob, Charlie and
Dave. In this case a multiple secure channels. This would
create a large overhead of communication. However, privacy
often come at a cost, and we argue that this overhead is an
unavoidable privacy tradeoff.
Posting Comments
Posting comments involves, usually, multiple readers. As
highlighted by our goals, we aim to keep the identity of in-
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Figure 3: Alice request Bob’s profile PBob through the routing friends FAlicei and FBobj . Such that, i ∈ RAlice
and j ∈ RBob.
Alice: minit ← (“chat request” ||N)
Alice → Bob: EncpkBob(minit), SignskAlice(minit)
Alice ← Bob: {m1}κ , s.t. κ = H(τAlice||τBob||N)
...
Alice ↔ Bob: {mi}κ
Figure 4: Exchange messages, where κ represent the
short lived session key and N a fresh random nonce.
teractions among users anonymous, i.e., keeping the OSN
oblivious on who is involved in the interactions. Naturally,
Alice cannot post a comment directly to Bob’s profile as
her identity would be compromised. Also, she cannot use
a routing friend F as it causes an impersonation and thus
lead to social issues. With our approach, Alice utilizes Bob
to place the comment on her behalf on his profile PBob. The
process can be briefly described as follows. First, Alice sends
Bob an encrypted message containing the message and the
intended recipient set. Consequently, Bob authenticates Al-
ice and publishes the comment in his wall, to be intended
for the limited set of recipients. In this way, Bob can ver-
ify the post before being published, edit and publish. For
other users comments, our system operates as depicted in
Figure 5. Note that, to provide a comment, users must have
knowledge of the τBob. Each message/comment on the sys-
tem is composed by the tuple message, user that published
the comment and a digital signature for integrity of such
user.
Let ςu ← (m,uid, Signu(m)), for u = {Alice,Bob, Clark}
Alice → Bob: cm ← {ςAlice}κ , s.t. κ = H(τBob)
...
Bob: Publishes cm
...
Clark ← Bob: Request(cm)
Clark → Bob: c′m ← {ςAlice||ςClark}κ
Figure 5: Post comments process
Currently, the protocol illustrated in Figure 5 does not
enforce any kind of access control and its secret κ does not
provide forward secrecy. However, later we discuss ways
to provide such properties such as the usage of broadcast
encryption techniques [4, 30]
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now turn to analyze the security and privacy resilience
of our system under the adversary modeled in Section 3.
We demonstrate that such an adversary does not learn the
interactions occurring, whether working independently or in
collaboration with one of the routing friends. Furthermore,
we show that a routing friend cannot authenticate himself
to access unauthorized content by impersonating other.
User Anonymity: Our system achieves user anonymity
when one accesses content of another. This is possible be-
cause Alice requests, for example, PBob using the protocol
in Figure 3. In fact, as aforementioned, tunneling through
Tor provides nice security and privacy features, thus, Al-
ice’s identity is kept anonymous towards the OSN provider,
FBobj and Bob. In fact, on the prying eyes of an adversary
such as the OSN provider, FBobj is the one requesting PBob
or any other content. Note that this process can be done
directly through Bob. Besides the fact that Alice reveals
τBob to FBobj (or Bob) this does not reveals that it is Alice
who is requesting the content. This is because τBob is also
shared with others in RBob or LBob, making the anonymity
set large enough for possible match. Also, the same applies
on the case that FBobj colludes with the OSN provider.
Communication Anonymity: For an adversary like the
OSN provider, it is hard to predict that Alice and Bob are
communicating, i.e., exchanging messages or placing com-
ments. In fact, the communication is executed by ΛAlice
and ΛBob using a different channel from the OSN, thus, out-
side the prying eyes of such adversary. In addition, on the
case a stronger adversary (e.g., government) colludes with
the Internet Service Providers and listens to the communica-
tion, he cannot retrieve the shared secret and thus decrypt
the communication. Although, such adversary could infer
that Alice and Bob are communicating. This could be solve
by creating a secure channel through a AN, like Tor.
Content Privacy: As all communications are encrypted,
only authorized recipients are able to retrieve the content.
Further, the authenticity of the message is protected by dig-
ital signature. For the authentication, it is hard for an non-
authorized user to access any content from Bob. Whereas
it is possible for such adversarial user to replay the request
message, it is infeasible to decrypt the message as it it en-
crypted with τBob. To avoid the replay attack, a timestamp
could be added to the request. Moreover, guessing the τ
corresponds to predict the output of the MAC, which can
only be done with probability 1/2n, where n is the number
of bits of the MAC output, which is negligible.
Whereas we tackle several privacy and security issues on
the social network, we stress the fact that we do not protect
against side-channel attacks, such as timing and correlation
attacks.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the viability of our proposal, we imple-
mented a proof-of-concept prototype of the system proposed
in Section 4 as a Firefox plugin, named VF-App.1 In this
section, we describe the architecture (Section 6.1) and the
actual steps performed in the communication process (Sec-
tion 6.2). Later (in Section 6.3), we analyze the performance
of our implementation.
6.1 Architecture
The architecture of our VF-App is illustrated in Figure 6.
In particular, we can observer two main components: a re-
quester component (VF-Requester) and a routing compo-
nent (VF-Router). The former executes and processes the
requests, whereas, the latter routes, authenticates and re-
trieves the requested information. Both components are em-
bedded and run as an unique browser extension on the user
environment. The working of the components is described
in the following.
VF-Requester: this component is used to realize the out-
of-band anonymous request information service. VF-
Requester handle the request of the user, allowing the
choice of which path to take to route the request.
VF-Router: the router component operates as user local
server that routes the requested data. Therefore, its
role is twofold: (1) from the requester side, e.g., form
ΛAlice side, it receives Alice request and forwards it
through Tor using Vidalia;2 (2) when processing a re-
quest, e.g., as ΛFBobj , the authenticator module first
verifies that the requester (Alice) is authorized to ac-
cess the requested data (e.g., Bob profile), then it re-
trieves the requested information: the retrieve is done
using the Facebook authentication token of the user
running the extension (i.e., the one of ΛFBobj in our
example). Each user local server has an associated web
address to be contacted, such as IP or domain name
base addresses. This allows, for instance, ΛBob to be
reached by ΛAlice.
1Source of our implementations is available upon request.
2https://www.torproject.org/projects/vidalia.html.en
The current prototype is compatible with Firefox 14+ and
could be easily ported to other browsers (e.g., Chrome), as it
is written in simple Javascript. Besides its easy installation
process, the VirtualFriendShip requires Vidalia for tunnel-
ing through Tor. The use of Tor is an important utility as
our system uses it to achieve unobservability and anonymity
of the communication. Also, our implementation makes use
of Polipo3 to convert the HTTP requests into SOCKS [29],
i.e., the protocol operated by Tor. In addition, our commu-
nication processes involve simple symmetric-key operations
that are executed in Javascript using the Stanford Javascript
Crypto Library (SJCL) [38]. Both VF-Client and VF-Server
use port 8765 for communication. Finally, we recall from our
model that in order to allow Alice to access Bob’s profile, at
least one FBobj must be online and logged in to Facebook.
VirtualFriendship Firefox Extension Architecture
VF-RouterVF-Requester
User
Interface
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Authenticator
VF 
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Figure 6: VirtualFriendshp Architecture
To bootstrap the system users establish connections with
their friends. Therefore, user u (e.g., Alice) retrieves and
uploads a JSON file containing an initial set of information
Iu′ (i.e., the credentials of user u
′, e.g., Bob). The set Iu′ is
composed by: the token τu′ ; and a list of the routing friends
Γn(u,u′), i.e., friends that u (Alice) can use to reach from u
′
(Bob). Currently, this exchange is performed automatically
using email. However, it could be implemented via other
offline channels, such as a USB flash drive. The list of friends
is stored locally as a JSON object.
6.2 Communication Process
We have implemented a prototype of VirtualFriendship as
Firefox extension (VF-app). In this section, we sketch the
steps to access a user profile, assuming that Alice wish to
retrieve PBob. Also, Alice wants to keep this action oblivious
towards the OSN provider, as well as to the routing friend
of Bob and Bob himself. The VF-app installed in Alice
machine will follow our protocol, as depicted in Figure 7.
In particular, VF-app will execute these steps.
1. Select from the list Γn(Alice,Bob) given by Bob: as an
3http://www.pps.univ-paris-diderot.fr/˜jch/software/polipo
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Figure 7: VirtualFriendship Access content Protocol
exit point FAlicei , and an entry point FBobj . The ex-
tension automatically encrypts the request using Bob’s
shared key and sends the the request to FAlicei , with
destination FBobj and requesting PBob.
2. In order to process the request as soon as it is made,
FAlicei is required to be online. FAlicei receives the re-
quest, and forwards it to FBobj , using Tor. Please note
that this step could be bypassed sending the request
directly to FBobj via Tor. However, as prior described,
we argue that Alice trusts, socially, FAlicei to be her
exit point instead of the first node in Tor.
3. The friend FBobj of Bob (which is a entry point to Bob)
receives an encrypted request from someone using the
shared key of Bob. Hence, FBobj verifies the authen-
ticity of the request. Then, FBobj (which is signed in
to Facebook) collects the Facebook token for authen-
tication, and makes a FQL4 request for Bob’s profile
to Facebook.
4. Facebook replies to the FQL request from FBobj con-
taining PBob. We recall that this is possible since B1 is
a Facebook friend of Bob, i.e., FBobj ∈ RBob. In fact,
on the view of Facebook, it was FBobj who accesses
PBob (and not Alice).
5. After, FBobj encrypts the Facebook response with Bob
shared key, and sends it back to FAlicei .
6. Finally, FAlicei just re-directs the response to Alice.
The VF-Requester decrypts the message and displays
the PBob in the browser window as a regular webpage
of the OSN.
We underline that the first and last steps of the protocol
are performed by the VF-Requester, where the remainder
are executed by the VF-Router component, outside the OSN
network. With the above steps, all actions are automated
and transparently towards Alice, whereas the OSN provider
is kept oblivious toward the actual interaction between Alice
and Bob (i.e., that Alice accesses Bob’s profile).
6.3 Performance
In order to analyze the practical usability and perfor-
mance of our system, we focus on measuring two costly
factors: the cryptographic overheard added for token pro-
tection and authentication of the requested content; and the
4https://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/fql/
average communication overheard required for a profile re-
quest.
Figure 8 shows the average communication overhead added
by the VirtualFriendship when compared to a normal Face-
book browsing. We have compared when retrieving just the
personal details of the profile (i.e., personal information),
such as, name, gender, date of birth and city. With extract-
ing the full profile, i.e., full personal information and recent
timeline events. In addition, we analyze the differences when
adding Tor. As represented in Figure 8, we can conclude
that there is a significant difference on performance. How-
ever, we stress that those are milliseconds, and thus, almost
negligible on a view of a user.
Figure 8: VirtualFriendship time overhead
With respect to the cryptographic overhead, we use AES-
CMAC [37] for the MAC implementation and AES-CCM [40]
for authenticated symmetric encryption, as they are already
available in SJCL [38]. Thus, the authentication process is
resumed to MAC implementation which takes about 2msec.
Whereas for the symmetric encryption of the full profile (ap-
proximately 80kB), it takes about 10msec.
7. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, VirtualFriendship is the
first attempt to construct a hybrid privacy-enhanced exten-
sion for current centralized OSNs. However, it is far from
tackling all privacy issues in OSNs. Specially, the cases
where multiple recipients are involved and access control is
required. In this section, we discuss possible extensions to
our system regarding access of content management and the
use of other privacy-enhanced authentication mechanisms,
such as anonymous credentials.
7.1 Access Management
Now we turn to discuss the approach of using different
levels of access control. Segregation of information presents
an important property for OSN users privacy, as discussed
in [6, 39]. Famous OSNs, such as Facebook and Google+,
already introduce segregation mechanisms with the use of
lists and groups, respectively. Although such mechanisms
offer some sort privacy preferences those are coarse and do
not protect from the OSN provider.
Currently, our system provides a single token per all con-
nections or per group. For example, that Bob defines the
following lists LWorkBob and LFamilyBob , such that LWorkBob = {Al-
ice, Clark, Dave}, and LFamilyBob = {Mom, Dad, Sister}. This,
however, creates a storage overhead and complicates the re-
vocation procedure. With this approach one cannot enforce
a more flexible access control per content, e.g., on the case
that Alice and Clark are in different groups and the content
published should be access by just Alice and Clark. In addi-
tion, it does not provide transparency, as Alice is not aware
of who else is in LWorkBob besides Γn(Alice,Bob).
From existing solutions tackling content privacy, Scram-
ble! [7] is the only that addresses such issue, employing ac-
cess control per content with anonymous broadcast encryp-
tion (ABE) [4, 30]. Whereas the recipient set is kept anony-
mous to outsiders, it is also anonymous to the insiders (i.e.,
towards the recipients of the content). Thus, the access con-
trol list employed is not transparent. For instance, Alice is
in the set but she does not know who else is in the set. Fur-
thermore, such approach although useful to enforce flexible
access control per content.
7.2 Anonymous Credentials
Authentication represents an important functionality of
our system. As described in the security analysis, our pro-
tocol does not provide forward secrecy. In fact, an attacker
can replay the request although he cannot decrypt it. The
authentication tokens provided (e.g., Alice provides τAlice to
Bob) could be generated in collaboration, using, for exam-
ple, an authenticated Diffie-Helman key agreement protocol.
However, such solution would not provide anonymity as each
user would have an unique token and thus an unique iden-
tifier.
Another possibility to perform authentication to a certain
content is to use anonymous credentials [10, 12]. Such solu-
tion, yet more costly efficient, allows users to prove knowl-
edge of some property in an anonymous way. For instance,
Alice can prove to FBobj or Bob himself that she is eligible to
access the requested content without disclosing her identity.
To setup such system, however, the initialization protocol
would become more complicated. Actually, by following the
same use case, Bob should issue a new credential to Alice
and indicate which FBobj can act as verifiers. Consequently,
the τBob would become a one-time token generated as a proof
of knowledge of the credential. In this way, Alice benefits
the nice privacy and security properties, such as anonymity
and forward secrecy, during the system operation with an
efficiency tradeoff. In addition, Bob can perform credential
revocation in a more efficient way.
7.3 Voting actions
Voting actions, such as “like” in Facebook, are simple to
perform and extensive used actions in OSNs. However, such
actions allow an adversary to compromise the privacy of
users. In particular, such adversary can compute the weights
and directly determine the strength of friendships and asso-
ciate common interests. Thus, it is hard to protect users
identity when such voting actions are performed. Whereas
addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper, an
interesting solution could be the use of e-voting techniques
with double spending protection, e.g., [11]. However, such
solution requires an extra entity to act as a bank and issue
and manage coins. Consequently, as aforementioned, effec-
tive means of addressing this issues are beyond this paper’s
scope.
7.4 Mobile Extension
With the enormous growth on usage of mobile devices,
such as tablets and smartphones, mobile users represent the
majority of traffic in OSNs [13]. Currently, our implemen-
tation is compatible with Firefox 14.x, however, the low
overhead of VirtualFriendship makes it appropriate to such
constrained devices (e.g., AES-CCM encryption takes about
50msec on constrained laptop). In fact, the mobile setting
can represent a asset to the availability of routing friends.
Nowadays such devices allow users to be constantly online,
thus, as each user in the VirtualFriendship system runs a
local server this allows such server to be also continuously
online.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a solution to mitigate the problem
of privacy as hiding user’s interactions when using central-
ized OSNs. We adhere to an adversary that is able to link
users interactions and further associate the strength of such
connections, such as the OSN provider. We analyzed the
privacy risks on current OSNs and proposed a system that
allows end-peers to interact anonymously within the OSNs.
We present, to the best of our knowledge, the novel ap-
proach of routing friends, where we abuse the definition of
trust in social interactions from [17]. Furthermore, we have
implemented our system as a proof of knowledge prototype
to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Later, we
evaluated and show that the overhead introduced by the so-
lution is limited and, thus, we believe to be negligible to
users.
Our current solution, as discussed throughout this paper,
did not plan or solve all the privacy issues on OSNs. Thus,
we foresee potential future work and open questions. In par-
ticular, extensions with the implementation of comments,
revocation of users without re-distribution of access tokens,
and address anonymity of actions such as “like” in Facebook.
In addition, we aim to extend the proof of knowledge im-
plementation with all available operations into a real world
open source application. Also, as a large number of users use
their mobile devices to connect to OSNs, a mobile version
of the system becomes attractive.
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